Week 9

Kant's Rational Religion of Reason questions and answers

Note: This is under construction. The first 8 of the 19 questions have been answered. There is a section below "Cahoone's statements from the transcript in reference to the key questions" which simply adds Cahoone's responses to almost all the questions. 

 Importance of Things in Themselves for Kant

Q2 Why is it important for Kant that we retain the notion of things in themselves?  Is it possible to have experience without them?  How is his notion of idealism different from Berkeley’s?

Immanuel Kant's notion of "things in themselves" (German: Ding an sich) is crucial for several reasons within his philosophical framework:

1. Metaphysical Distinction:
Kant argues that things in themselves are metaphysically distinct from appearances. This distinction is essential because it allows Kant to maintain that there is a reality independent of our perceptions and representations. Without this distinction, the world would be reduced to mere appearances, which Kant saw as insufficient[2][3][4].

2. Grounding Appearances:
   Kant posits that appearances must be grounded in something that appears. He argues that it is absurd to think of an appearance without something underlying it. This means that the existence of appearances logically entails the existence of things in themselves, even if we cannot cognize these things directly[2][4].

3. Transcendental Idealism:
   Kant's transcendental idealism hinges on the idea that space and time are not properties of things in themselves but rather the forms of our sensible intuition. This means that objects as we experience them (appearances) are shaped by our cognitive faculties, but there must be an underlying reality (things in themselves) that exists independently of these faculties[3][5].

 Possibility of Experience Without Things in Themselves

According to Kant, it is not possible to have experience without the notion of things in themselves. Here’s why:

- Necessity for Persistence and Time Determinations:
  Kant argues in the "Refutation of Idealism" that our ability to determine time and persistence in our experiences requires the existence of something external and persistent. This external persistence is what allows us to make judgments about time and our own existence[4].

- Analytic Relation Between Appearances and Things in Themselves:
  Kant suggests that the concept of appearance analytically implies the existence of something that appears. Therefore, if we have appearances, we must also have things in themselves, even if we cannot know them as they are in themselves[2][4].

 Difference from Berkeley’s Idealism

Kant's idealism, specifically his transcendental idealism, differs significantly from George Berkeley's idealism in several key ways:

1. Nature of Reality:
   - Berkeley's Idealism: Berkeley argues that reality consists solely of minds and their ideas. According to him, objects exist only as perceptions in the minds of observers. This is a form of subjective idealism where the external world is reduced to mental states[3].
   - Kant's Transcendental Idealism: Kant, on the other hand, posits that while our experience of the world is shaped by our cognitive faculties (space, time, and categories), there is an underlying reality (things in themselves) that exists independently of our perceptions. This is not a subjective idealism but rather a transcendental idealism that acknowledges an objective reality beyond our representations[3][4].

2. Role of the Mind:
   - Berkeley: In Berkeley's view, the mind is the sole creator of reality through its perceptions.
   - Kant: For Kant, the mind organizes and structures the raw data of intuition (the manifold) into a coherent experience using its built-in forms of intuition (space and time) and categories. However, this does not mean the mind creates the reality itself; rather, it shapes how we experience that reality[3][5].

3. Epistemological Limitations:
   - Berkeley: Berkeley does not acknowledge any epistemological limitations in the sense that what we perceive is the entirety of reality.
   - Kant: Kant introduces a critical distinction between what we can know (appearances) and what lies beyond our knowledge (things in themselves). This distinction highlights the limitations of human knowledge and the existence of an unknowable reality[2][3][4].

In summary, Kant's notion of things in themselves is essential for maintaining a distinction between the world as it appears to us and the world as it is in itself, which is a fundamental aspect of his transcendental idealism. This approach differs significantly from Berkeley's subjective idealism by acknowledging an independent reality and the mind's role in shaping, rather than creating, our experience of the world.

Citations:
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself
[2] https://philarchive.org/archive/BEIETE
[3] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/
[4] https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/f0y4j3/whatwaskantsargumentfortheexistenceofthe/
[5] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/
[6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontic
[7] https://study.com/academy/lesson/deontology-definition-theory-ethics-examples.html
[8] https://epochemagazine.org/07/the-thing-in-itself-a-problem-child/

 
Q3 The cost of providing a solution to Hume’s argument is that we end up with the things in themselves, which we can’t know.  Instead, all we can be certain of applies to the realm of phenomena.
 

The Trade-Off in Kant's Response to Hume

Immanuel Kant's philosophical system, particularly his Critique of Pure Reason, was partly a response to the skeptical challenges posed by David Hume. Here’s how Kant's solution to Hume's arguments comes with the cost of introducing the concept of "things in themselves" and the limitations it imposes on our knowledge:

 Hume's Challenge

Hume's skepticism, especially regarding causality and induction, questioned the basis of our knowledge claims. He argued that our understanding of causation is based on habit and custom rather than any necessary connection between events. This challenged the traditional notions of metaphysics and the nature of reality.

 Kant's Solution

Kant's response involved a radical rethinking of the relationship between the mind and the world. Here are the key points:

1. Synthetic a Priori Knowledge:
   Kant argued that certain knowledge claims, such as those in mathematics and metaphysics, are both synthetic (derived from experience) and a priori (known independently of experience). He claimed that these knowledge claims are possible because the mind actively organizes and structures our experience.

2. Transcendental Idealism:
   Kant introduced his transcendental idealism, which posits that space and time are not properties of the world in itself but rather the forms of our sensible intuition. This means that our experience of the world is shaped by our cognitive faculties.

3. Categories and Schematism:
   Kant also introduced the categories of the understanding, which are the concepts through which we organize our experience. These categories, along with the schematism of the understanding, allow us to make sense of the world by imposing a certain structure on our perceptions.

 The Cost: Things in Themselves

The cost of Kant's solution is the introduction of the concept of "things in themselves" (Ding an sich), which are the objects as they exist independently of our perceptions. Here’s why this is a cost:

1. Limitations of Knowledge:
   Kant argues that we can never know things in themselves directly. Our knowledge is limited to the realm of phenomena, which are the objects as they appear to us through our cognitive faculties. This means that we can be certain only about the world as it is structured by our minds, not about the world as it is in itself.

2. Noumena vs. Phenomena:
   Kant distinguishes between noumena (things in themselves) and phenomena (things as they appear). While we can have extensive knowledge about phenomena, noumena remain beyond our cognitive reach. This distinction highlights the limitations of human knowledge and introduces a fundamental gap between what we can know and what exists independently of our knowledge.

 Implications

The implications of this trade-off are significant:

- Epistemological Humility: Kant's philosophy introduces a form of epistemological humility, recognizing that there are limits to what we can know. This humility is a direct result of acknowledging the role of the mind in shaping our experience.

- Metaphysical Speculation: By limiting our knowledge to the realm of phenomena, Kant restricts the scope of metaphysical speculation. We can no longer claim to know the nature of reality independently of our perceptions.

- Ethical and Practical Implications: This distinction also has implications for ethics and practical philosophy. For instance, Kant's moral philosophy relies on the idea that we treat individuals as ends in themselves, which is a notion that transcends the realm of phenomena but is grounded in our understanding of moral law.

In summary, Kant's response to Hume's skepticism involves a complex interplay between the mind's role in shaping our experience and the limitations this imposes on our knowledge. The cost of this solution is the introduction of the unknowable "things in themselves," which restricts our certainty to the realm of phenomena.

Q4 This makes him “The Great Destroyer”.  That is, according to Kant, historically significant philosophical problems like the existence of God, free will, a substantial self, the origin of the world, are not experienceable—hence, not subject to our Understanding.  They are also unresolvable through Reason.

In Immanuel Kant's philosophy, particularly as outlined in his Critique of Pure Reason, he addresses several historically significant philosophical problems and argues that they are beyond the reach of human understanding and reason in certain fundamental ways. Here’s how Kant's views lead to the label of "The Great Destroyer" in this context:

 Limits of Understanding and Reason

1. Phenomena vs. Noumena:
   Kant distinguishes between phenomena (objects as they appear to us) and noumena (objects as they are in themselves). He argues that our understanding is limited to the realm of phenomena, and we cannot know noumena directly. This distinction is crucial because it sets a boundary on what we can know through our senses and cognitive faculties[1][3][5].

2. Synthetic a Priori Knowledge:
   While Kant does allow for synthetic a priori knowledge, which is knowledge that is both derived from experience and known independently of experience, this knowledge is still confined to the realm of phenomena. It does not extend to things in themselves or to metaphysical entities that exist independently of our experience[2][3].

 Unresolvable Problems

1. Existence of God:
   Kant argues that the existence of God is not something that can be proven or disproven through empirical evidence or rational argumentation. Instead, he posits that the concept of God is a regulative idea, which means it serves as a guiding principle for our moral and philosophical inquiries but is not an object of knowledge[3][5].

2. Free Will:
   The problem of free will versus determinism is another area where Kant's philosophy sets limits. He argues that, from the perspective of our understanding, the world operates according to deterministic laws. However, for moral purposes, we must assume the existence of free will, even though this cannot be proven empirically or through reason alone[3].

3. Substantial Self:
   Kant's view on the self is complex. He argues that the unity of consciousness, or the transcendental unity of apperception, is a necessary condition for our experience, but this unity is not an empirical or metaphysical entity that we can know directly. The self, as a substantial entity, remains beyond our cognitive grasp[4].

4. Origin of the World:
   Kant addresses the antinomies, which are pairs of contradictory but validly proven claims, such as whether the world has a beginning in time and is limited in space or whether it is infinite in both respects. He argues that these antinomies arise because we are trying to apply our understanding to things in themselves, which is beyond our capacity. Thus, the origin of the world, in the sense of its ultimate nature, is not something we can resolve through reason[3].

 Conclusion

Kant's philosophy, by setting these limits on what we can know and resolve, can indeed be seen as "destructive" of certain traditional metaphysical and epistemological ambitions. He effectively curtails the scope of human knowledge, restricting it to the realm of phenomena and denying us direct access to things in themselves. This makes him "The Great Destroyer" of certain long-held philosophical aspirations to know the world in its ultimate, metaphysical sense.

Citations:
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself
[2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/
[3] https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/
[4] https://ilariocolli.com/articles/the-kantian-self
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CritiqueofPureReason
[6] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/
[7] https://epochemagazine.org/07/the-thing-in-itself-a-problem-child/
[8] https://philarchive.org/archive/ENGTCO-17

Q5 5. What does Kant mean by Reason?  What does Reason strive to do (particularly given the findings of science)?

In Immanuel Kant's philosophy, the concept of Reason is complex and multifaceted, playing a crucial role in both his theoretical and practical philosophies.

 Definition and Faculties of Reason

Kant distinguishes Reason from other mental faculties such as sensibility and understanding:

- Sensibility: This faculty provides sensory representations and is receptive to external stimuli[3].
- Understanding: This faculty generates conceptual representations and is responsible for organizing sensory data into coherent experiences through the categories of the understanding[3].
- Reason: Reason is the highest rational mental faculty, characterized by its spontaneity and its ability to generate special sorts of concepts, which Kant calls 'ideas' or 'notions'. These ideas are not derived from experience but are rather the products of Reason's own activity[3][4].

 Role of Reason

1. Faculty of Principles:
   Kant often refers to Reason as "the faculty of principles" (A299/B356), emphasizing its role in providing the highest-level principles that guide our understanding and action. These principles are not derived from empirical data but are rather a priori, meaning they are known independently of experience[1][4].

2. Synthetic a Priori Knowledge:
   Reason enables us to achieve synthetic a priori knowledge, which is knowledge that is both derived from reason (and thus independent of experience) and provides new information (synthetic) rather than just analyzing existing concepts (analytic). This is particularly evident in mathematics and metaphysics, where Kant argues that certain knowledge claims can be made a priori[2][5].

3. Transcendental Ideas:
   Reason generates transcendental ideas, which are concepts that go beyond the limits of possible experience. These include ideas about God, the soul, and the world as a whole. However, Kant warns that these ideas often lead to errors and contradictions when we try to apply them to objects beyond the realm of experience[1][3].

 Striving of Reason

Given the findings of science and the limitations of human knowledge, Reason strives to do several things:

- Seek Unity and Systematicity:
   Reason has a natural inclination to seek unity and systematicity in our knowledge. Kant writes that "the law of reason to seek unity is necessary, since without it we would have no reason, and without that, no coherent use of the understanding"[1].

- Guide Action and Justify Moral Principles:
   In practical philosophy, Reason guides action and justifies moral principles. Against empiricist claims that reason is inactive and cannot motivate moral action, Kant argues that Reason enables us to act on principles that we can share with other rational beings, thus revealing human freedom and moral agency[1].

- Appreciate Its Own Limits:
   Reason must also appreciate its own limits to avoid falling into contradictions and errors. Kant emphasizes that Reason needs to present itself to itself in the process of gaining clarity about its own workings and the principles it must give to itself[1].

 Implications for Science

In the context of science, Kant's view of Reason implies that:

- Causality and Laws:
   Reason imposes conceptual organizing principles, such as causality, on our experience of the world. This means that scientific laws and principles are not discovered in nature independently but are rather the result of Reason's activity in organizing our experience[2][3].

- Limits of Knowledge:
   While science can provide extensive knowledge about the world, Reason recognizes that there are limits to what we can know. Kant argues that we cannot know things in themselves but only as they appear to us through our cognitive faculties. This sets a boundary on the ambitions of scientific inquiry[2][3].

In summary, Kant's concept of Reason is central to his philosophy, enabling synthetic a priori knowledge, guiding moral action, and seeking unity and systematicity in our understanding of the world, all while acknowledging and respecting its own limits.

Citations:
[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CritiqueofPureReason
[3] https://iep.utm.edu/kantmind/
[4] https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/opphil-2022-0203/html?lang=en
[5] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/
[6] https://study.com/academy/lesson/deontology-definition-theory-ethics-examples.html
[7] https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/
[8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontic
 

Q6 What does Kant mean by the term dialectic?  How does his meaning differ from the way Plato uses the term?

Immanuel Kant's understanding and use of the term "dialectic" differ significantly from Plato's, reflecting their distinct philosophical approaches and objectives.

 Kant's Dialectic

For Kant, the term "dialectic" is associated with the logical and methodological issues that arise when reason extends beyond the limits of possible experience. Here are the key points:

1. Logic of Illusion:
   Kant describes dialectic as a "logic of illusion" (A61), where reason falls into contradictions and errors when it tries to apply its principles beyond the realm of phenomena to things in themselves[5].

2. Antinomies:
   Kant's dialectic is characterized by the antinomies, which are pairs of contradictory but rationally defensible propositions. These antinomies arise because reason demands unconditioned completeness, which cannot be satisfied within the empirical realm. For example, the antinomies include the conflict between the thesis that the world has a beginning in time and the antithesis that it has no beginning[2].

3. Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis:
   While Kant does not use the exact terms "thesis," "antithesis," and "synthesis" in the same way as Hegel, his dialectical method involves the presentation of opposing arguments (theses and antitheses) that highlight the contradictions and limitations of reason when it ventures beyond empirical experience. However, Kant does not aim for a synthesis in the Hegelian sense but rather seeks to expose and resolve these contradictions by recognizing the limits of reason[2].

 Plato's Dialectic

In contrast, Plato's use of the term "dialectic" is rooted in his method of philosophical inquiry and his metaphysical and ontological views:

1. Socratic Method:
   Plato's dialectic is closely associated with the Socratic method, which involves a dialogue between Socrates and his interlocutors. This method aims to reach true knowledge through a process of questioning and refutation, leading to a clearer understanding of the subject matter[4][5].

2. Ontological and Metaphysical Role:
   For Plato, dialectic is a process that allows the intellect to ascend from the sensible world to the intelligible world, ultimately reaching the supreme idea or the Form oof the Good. Dialectic is the only science that does away with hypotheses to reach the first principle, aiming for a unified, holistic theory[5].

3. Overcoming Opinion:
   Plato's dialectic is designed to overcome mere opinion (doxa) and reach authentic knowledge. It involves confronting various positions, testing hypotheses, and examining their consequences to achieve a deeper understanding of reality[5].

 Differences

- Purpose and Scope:
  - Kant's dialectic is primarily concerned with exposing the limitations and contradictions of reason when it attempts to transcend the bounds of empirical experience. It is a critical tool to understand the limits of human knowledge.
  - Plato's dialectic, on the other hand, is a method for achieving true knowledge and understanding the ultimate reality, bridging the gap between the sensible and intelligible worlds.

- Methodological Approach:
  - Kant's dialectic involves the presentation of antinomies to highlight the contradictions and errors that arise from reason's overreach. It does not aim for a synthesis but rather for clarifying the boundaries of knowledge.
  - Plato's dialectic is a more constructive method, using dialogue and refutation to ascend to higher levels of understanding and ultimately to grasp the first principles and supreme ideas.

- Metaphysical Implications:
  - Kant's dialectic is tied to his transcendental idealism, emphasizing the distinction between phenomena and noumena and the limits of human knowledge.
  - Plato's dialectic is integral to his metaphysics, which posits a hierarchy of reality with the intelligible world of Forms being more fundamental than the sensible world[5].

In summary, while both Kant and Plato use the term "dialectic," Kant's usage is focused on the critical examination of reason's limitations and the resolution of antinomies, whereas Plato's dialectic is a method for achieving true knowledge and understanding the ultimate reality through a process of philosophical inquiry and ascension to the intelligible world.

Citations:
[1] https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/opphil-2022-0272/html?lang=en
[2] https://fortnightlyreview.co.uk/2020/11/immanuel-kant-origin-dialectic/
[3] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel-dialectics/
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectic
[5] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/platos-dialectics-nicolae-sfetcu
[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RYrGJUpwsM
[7] https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/rj19rt/kantsuseofthetermdialectic/
[8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CritiqueofPureReason
 

Q7 How does Reason end up undermining itself?  How is Reason tragic?

In Immanuel Kant's philosophy, particularly in his Critique of Pure Reason, Reason is seen as both a powerful and limiting faculty, leading to a kind of tragedy or self-undermining in its aspirations. Here are the key points that illustrate how Reason ends up undermining itself and why it can be considered tragic:

 The Limits of Reason

1. Transcendental Illusions:
   Kant argues that Reason is prone to what he calls "transcendental illusions" or a "logic of illusion" (A293/B349)[1]. When Reason attempts to extend its principles beyond the realm of possible experience, it falls into contradictions and errors. This is because Reason seeks unconditioned completeness, which cannot be satisfied within the empirical realm.

2. Antinomies:
   The antinomies are a prime example of how Reason undermines itself. These are pairs of contradictory but rationally defensible propositions that arise when Reason tries to apply its principles to the world as a whole. For instance, the antinomies include conflicts such as whether the world has a beginning in time and is limited in space, or whether it has no beginning and no limits[1][2].

 The Tragic Aspect of Reason

1. Aspirations vs. Capabilities:
   Reason has a natural inclination to seek unity, systematicity, and ultimate explanations. However, this aspiration is tragic because it exceeds the capabilities of human cognition. Reason strives for knowledge of things in themselves, God, the soul, and the world as a whole, but these are precisely the areas where it fails to deliver[1][2].

2. Self-Deception and False Rationalizations:
   Kant warns that Reason can lead to self-deception and false rationalizations when it ventures beyond its legitimate domain. Philosophers may think they are reasoning about transcendent truths when, in fact, they are merely generating empty or false ideas. This self-deception arises because Reason is not transparent or infallible, as some rationalist philosophers had believed[1].

3. Recognition of Its Own Limits:
   The tragic aspect of Reason also lies in its need to recognize its own limits. Kant argues that Reason must present itself to itself to gain clarity about its own workings and the principles it must give to itself. This self-awareness is necessary to avoid the errors and contradictions that arise from overstepping its bounds. However, this recognition of limitations is itself a form of tragedy, as it curbs the ambitious claims of metaphysics and speculative reason[1][3].

 Metaphysical and Epistemological Implications

1. Restrictions on Knowledge:
   Kant's critique of metaphysics shows that Reason cannot provide knowledge of the supersensible realm, such as the existence of God, the soul, or the ultimate nature of the world. This restriction is tragic because it limits the scope of human knowledge to the empirical realm, leaving many fundamental questions unanswered[2].

2. Contrast with Empiricism and Rationalism:
   Kant's view of Reason is a middle ground between empiricism and rationalism. While he acknowledges the necessity of empirical data, he also argues that Reason has a constructive role in organizing and understanding this data. However, this middle ground is itself a compromise, reflecting the limitations and contradictions that Reason encounters when it tries to transcend empirical boundaries[2][3].

In summary, the tragedy of Reason in Kant's philosophy lies in its inherent tendency to strive for knowledge beyond its capabilities, leading to contradictions, illusions, and self-deception. Reason's aspirations for ultimate truths and systematic unity are constantly thwarted by its own limitations, making it a tragic figure in the pursuit of knowledge.

Citations:
[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason/
[2] https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/
[3] https://iep.utm.edu/kantmind/
[4] https://ilariocolli.com/articles/the-kantian-self
[5] https://fortnightlyreview.co.uk/2020/11/immanuel-kant-origin-dialectic/
[6] https://epochemagazine.org/07/the-thing-in-itself-a-problem-child/
[7] https://www.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/f0y4j3/whatwaskantsargumentfortheexistenceofthe/
[8] https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/opphil-2022-0272/html?lang=en
 

Q8  How does Kant’s analysis regarding Reason relate to Hume’s claims?

Immanuel Kant's analysis of Reason, particularly in his Critique of Pure Reason, is deeply influenced by and responds to David Hume's skeptical claims about causation, knowledge, and the nature of reality. Here are the key points of how Kant's analysis relates to Hume's claims:

Hume's Skepticism on Causation

Hume argued that the concept of causation is not derived from reason or logical necessity but rather from habit and custom. He claimed that we cannot observe a necessary connection between cause and effect; all we can observe is the constant conjunction of events. This led Hume to conclude that causality is a mental construct, a habit of the mind rather than a feature of the external world[3][4][5].

Kant's Response: Synthetic a Priori Knowledge

Kant was deeply influenced by Hume's skepticism but sought to address its implications. Here’s how Kant responded:

1. Synthetic a Priori Judgments:
   Kant argued that certain knowledge claims, such as those involving causality, are synthetic a priori judgments. This means they are both derived independently of experience (a priori) and provide new information (synthetic). Kant contended that these judgments are possible because the mind imposes certain structures and categories on our experience, including the concept of causality[1][3][4].

2. Transcendental Idealism:
   Kant's transcendental idealism posits that space, time, and the categories of the understanding (including causality) are not properties of the world in itself but rather the forms through which we experience the world. This means that causality is not a feature of the external world that we discover through observation but a conceptual organizing principle imposed by the mind[1][3][4].

Causality as a Category of the Understanding

Kant integrated causality into his system as one of the twelve categories of the understanding. These categories are mental functions that organize our disparate perceptions into a coherent experience. The category of causality is not derived from experience but is an a priori concept that makes experience possible by injecting necessity and strict universality into our perceptions of the world[3][4].

Addressing Hume's Problem of Induction

Hume's problem of induction questioned how we can justify the assumption that the future will resemble the past. Kant addressed this by arguing that the mind's imposition of causal laws on our experience is what makes these laws necessary and universal. This is not based on empirical observation alone but on the a priori structure of the mind[3][4].

From Mind to World

Kant's approach is often summarized as moving "from mind to world," in contrast to Hume's approach, which moves "from world to mind." Kant argues that our experience of the world is pre-structured by the mind's faculties, including the categories and forms of intuition (space and time). This pre-structuring is what allows us to have a coherent and necessary understanding of causality, rather than it being a mere habit or custom[3].

Conclusion

In summary, Kant's analysis of Reason is a direct response to Hume's skeptical challenges regarding causation and knowledge. Kant argues that while Hume is correct that causality is not observable in the external world, he contends that causality is an a priori concept imposed by the mind, which makes our experience of the world coherent and necessary. This approach resolves Hume's skepticism by grounding causality in the mind's faculties rather than in empirical observations alone.

Citations:
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critique_of_Pure_Reason
[2] https://earlhaig.ca/departments/socialscience/downloads/Mr.%20Wittmann/2019-2020%20HZT4U1%20Handouts/HZT4U1%20Exemplars/HZT4U1%20Expository%20Essay%20Exemplar%202.pdf
[3] https://philosophynow.org/issues/49/Kant_versus_Hume_on_the_Necessary_Connection
[4] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/
[5] https://www.thecollector.com/david-hume-immanuel-kant-causation/
[6] https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/10vy4o/kant_versus_hume/
[7] https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/
[8] https://ilariocolli.com/articles/the-kantian-self

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Cahoone's statements from the transcript in reference to the key questions

Now, we're still not done with Kahn's Critique of Pure Reason because, remarkably, in addition to saving science and metaphysics from Hume, Kant had an entirely different second aim that he was pursuing in the Pure Reason, which dovetails with the first aim. It's one of the things that makes Kant the Great Philosopher, for he turns his skepticism regarding knowledge of things-in- themselves to an unexpected advantage.

The question is, and will be in today's lecture, we’ll sort of go and make an end run around to eventually get to this question, but the question He's gonna come around to, is—How can a deterministic science, which he has just defended, be compatible with free will, ethics, and religion? You might say he's done enough work so far in the Critique of Pure Reason, but not by Kant’s standards.

Question #1.“Kant had always said that he was fascinated by two things the starry sky above us and the moral life within us.”

His contributions to ethics, in which he remains the greatest proponent of a morality of rational Duty, that is to say, in ethics, in the last two three hundred years. The most prominent ethical theories competing each other have been, on the one hand—utilitarianism, in the work of John Stuart Mill and others, and on the other hand—a rational theory of duty. And Kant is by far the most famous proponent of that, so his Kant's contribution to ethics was just as great as his contribution to the theory of knowledge. Today we'll examine how Kant's account of the dialectic or unavoidable errors of reason, when it tries to know too much, leads to a defense of faith and morality from science. Why is it important for Kant that we retain the notion of things-in-themselves?  Is it possible to have experience without them?  How is his notion of idealism different from Berkeley’s?

Question #2 Why is it important for Kant that we retain the notion of things-in-themselves?  Is it possible to have experience without them?  How is his notion of idealism different from Berkeley’s?

Kant's notion of things in themselves is essential for maintaining a distinction between the world as it appears to us and the world as it is in itself, which is a fundamental aspect of his transcendental idealism. This approach differs significantly from Berkeley's subjective idealism by acknowledging an independent reality and the mind's role in shaping, rather than creating, our experience of the world. More

From Cahoone's lecture: Now, first of all, one might ask if we cannot know things-in-themselves, why posit them at all? And that's a very legitimate question. Indeed, as we'll see, German philosophers following Kant decided to just jettison things-in-themselves. But Kant couldn't do this because Kant thought if he if he simply removed things-in-themselves from his system—so that you would no longer say: well there's unknown things-in-themselves which are causing the sensations that populate my world of objective experience—he thought that if you threw out things-in-themselves, he would reduce himself to being a Berkeley idealist. In other words, he would end up in an idealist in Berkeley. Since Kant, instead, is a new kind of idealist, a critical idealist, our cognition is constructed by our minds, but things-in-themselves are not and the things-in-themselves cause the sensations which are organized by the active transcendental activity of our mind. So, Kant remains a defender of science and a world of real appearances. Appearances are mind independent, that is, independent of any individual mind.  And things-in-themselves are independent of all minds, and they cause the experience that science investigates. So, he's much more conservative than Berkeley.”

Question #3 The cost of providing a solution to Hume’s argument is that we end up with the things in themselves, which we can’t know.  Instead, all we can be certain of applies to the realm of phenomena.

From Cahoone's lecture: We've already seen that the cost of his solution to Hume’s argument, is that while we can have knowledge of experience in synthetic or priori; knowledge of the forms of experience, we can have no knowledge, whatsoever, of things-in-themselves, which are beyond the bounds of a possible experience we know appearances only not things-in-themselves independent of appearances and conscious saying, in effect, that Hume was right.

This means we have no knowledge of the mundane things-in-themselves that cause our experience— the chair in itself, the podium in itself. We know the podium as an appearance, as an objective appearance, a shared public objective experience— in other words, we are all experiencing the podium as a real object. Experience, however, is not a thing-in-itself. We don't experience the podium in-itself, the earth in-itself or even my own body-in-itself.

Question #4 This makes him “The Great Destroyer”.

From Cahoone's lecture: That is, according to Kant, historically significant philosophical problems like the existence of God, free will, a substantial self, the origin of the world, are not experienceable—hence, not subject to our Understanding.  They are also unresolvable through Reason. God, the origin of the world, my soul, a future state, that is the heaven, or immortality for my soul, or whether my soul has free will—like Hume, Kant was declaring all those objects, if they exist, out of bounds. That was why Mendelssohn called him the Great destroyer. But and here is the point, the Great destroyer had a hidden creative purpose.

Question #5a 

From Cahoone's lecture: Now, in an ingenious part of his Critique of Pure Reason—this first critique—that we've been looking, at there's a section called the “Dialectic of Pure Reason”. In it Kant explores the complex character of that third part of our knowing apparatus—reason. This takes some study, because Kant is changing the meaning of the word reason. The German word that's being translated as reason is Vernunft that’s very unlike https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_(Kant)#The_table_of_judgments understanding (Verstand). Reason and understanding, along with sensibility, or intuition, are the two faculties that give us knowledge of the everyday world. Reason is something else. What reason posits ideas in the Platonic sense.

Question #5b What does Reason strive to do (particularly given the findings of science)?

From Cahoone's lecture: Let's put it this way—reason tries to know everything. It is the nature of human reason to try to know. Kant’s not talking about logic now, or rationality, or the mere fact that human beings can converse rationally, as Aristotle would have meant by reason. Rationality to Kant means something very specific. Reason for Kant is that part of the human cognitive faculty which is attempting to know everything—to push the bounds of knowledge as far as they can go. In doing this, reason posits certain ultimate ideas. For example, the idea of a ground of being. In other words—God, the idea of a substantial self or soul, the idea of free will, the idea of the unity of the world, of experience. In other words, that all experiences have some total unity and cause. So what reason tries—to the way Kant thinks about this—is our experience, its many manifold various… Reason isn't satisfied with knowing—the cause of me is my parents, the cause of my parents is their parents. Maybe the cause of their parents was a chance meaning on an immigrant ship and the cause of that was something else.

Reason, science, and understanding track those causes.

Reason says, but wait, What's the first cause and what will be the last cause? Reason wants to go to the beginning, the end. Reason is, you could say, a little metaphysician—the little meta physician in our head that wants to complete every kind of knowledge, to press knowledge to its logical limits. It is driven to try to know the things-in-themselves.  Reason is, in this sense, creative.

As we'll see, it's also reason which is the faculty that posits laws for itself—the laws of ethics—but that's another story.

Now, reason posits ideals, in a purely regulative sense, as goals of inquiry. We will never presumably reach it. It serves as a helpful goal to our understanding, and our attempt to understand the world, as far as we can know. In other words, reason says there must be a first cause of the whole unit.

Well, what Kant would say is—science in principle can never reach that, but if it tries to find it, it will go as far as it can.

So, reason in its regulative employment, has a beneficial effect on inquiry in science. It pushes us to know more and more and more. That's good. Where reason goes wrong, is thinking you can know. All that you can get to—the end. There is no end from Kant's point of view. So, reason posits its ideals as real things. It goes beyond what can be known—and when it does, it generates a dialectic.

Question #6 What does Kant mean by the term dialectic?  How does his meaning differ from the way Plato uses the term?

From Cahoone's lecture: Now, the word dialectic is a kind of a strange term. The word was used by Plato, where essentially the dialectic means—in ancient Greek philosophy—it actually means the arguing back and forth of philosophers. I give a reason, you give a reason against it, you give a reason back. That arguing back and forth is called dialectic.

Kant is recapturing that idea. Hegel is going to make great use of it soon after. But Kant is taking an idea and twisting it into a rather pejorative meaning.

What countenance by dialectic is a logic of contradictions, a pace, a set of ideas, which—because they try to no too much—generates a contradiction, which generates another contradiction, and another contradiction.

What Kant is saying is, reason is dialectical when reason tries to know what cannot be known.

If it doesn't just peter out in skepticism it actually comes up with an answer that makes no sense.

And he has a long discussion of these kinds of answers, where he tries to show that traditional metaphysical positions lead to their opposite—lead logically to their opposite.

They crash and burn. One might say, in a certain sense, that reason is like an air-breathing jet trying to go so high that it starts to leave the atmosphere.

But if it does, it can't operate without any atmosphere and so it crashes.

Question #7 How does Reason end up undermining itself?  How is Reason tragic?

From Cahoone's lecture: Reason is tragic. What Kant is literally saying is we human beings cannot help or desist in positing and trying to know the ultimate metaphysical truths about God, the universe, the soul etc. But we can't know them, and in the attempt to know these things, reason causes endless trouble. For when it ventures into such territory, the unverifiable conclusions, it achieves paradoxically, leads to their opposites. And that's what he means by dialectic. That's why at the beginning of Kant's book, he says—rather depressingly looking back over the history of philosophy—he says the history of metaphysics is a history of mock combats, in which each side in the war gains a few miles. The next day, the other side gains it back, and the next day the first side gains it back etc.

So, in other words nothing's accomplished. It's in this part of his book, The Dialectic where he is trying to explain why that's always been true. It's been true because philosophers have been tempted by their reason to try to know what cannot be known—to go beyond the bounds of a possible experience.

Where does this leave us? Reason is tragic.

Question #8 How does Kant’s analysis regarding Reason relate to Hume’s claims?

From Cahoone's lecture: I mean in a certain way he's echoing Hume, although it's a different kind of tragedy. in Hume in Hume’s case he believes that we are naturally hardwired as natural creatures to have habit and believe things that for which there's no rational judge vacation and nature is too strong for principal Kant is not a naturalist his thought has nothing to do with how we're naturally programmed but what Kant wants to say is the tragedy of reason is that the human mind will forever keep falling into ditches whenever it tries to do metaphysics and it can't stop doing them we can't give up trying it's built into us okay so the question now is out of this sort of tragic nasty description of the limitations of human knowledge being called the great distort destroyed by Mendelssohn where does Kant leave us?

Question #9 Kant turns the tragedy of Reason into a positive gain

answer

Question 9b Why is he optimistic in view of the tragedy?

From Cahoone's lecture: Well, the amazing thing is, Kant has a positive gain—the philosophical gain that he's going to derive from this apparently sceptical position about what reason can know.

Now let's go back to science which Kant has saved from Hume. As far as he's concerned, science determines the cause of events. It does a lot of things, of course, scientists do lots of things. But one thing that scientists try to do, is determine the causes of events.

Kant has defended necessary connection as essential to science, and now—with this Copernican revolution—he can now say necessary connection is synthetic a priori.

We know that the events in our world of experience are going to have causes. Because if they didn't, we couldn't experience them. Our experience of the world brings with it a causal necessary connection structure.

But now let's look further at such a world—the world of appearances—which is completely open to scientific investigation.

If all things in themselves, if all things all nature, were knowable by science, then, presumably, Kant thinks this is th century Newtonian science.

That's his model for science; that is what Newton's work is in the th century.

But all through the th century, pretty much everyone believes that the Newtonian system is the true system of modern science. They expect only to fill in the details, not to overturn the whole system with the Newtonian background.

Question #10a Specifically, he acknowledges that the world of phenomena is characterized by determinism

This follows from the fact that our minds impose causality on this world.  But what is significant about us as human beings?  Are we simply caught up in the world of phenomena?  Are we only subject to the categories of Understanding?

From Cahoone's lecture: With the Newtonian background Kant can say, if Newton is right, it would seem that every appearance, every event in the apparent world, which we experience—knowledge of which he is saved from—would be causally deterministic.

If science is free to determine all features of reality, wherever science legitimately goes, we must presume causal determinism.

Kant's view here is very simple and straightforward. If we come in in the morning, and the podium has moved across the floor, and if we say, “Well, how did it move?” and if one reason for it to move—one reason is given, well it wanted to, it chose to move, it was tired of standing around here, and it wanted to just slide on over.

If explanations like that are allowed, science is dead, more or less. We presume that the objects of the of the world—which science treats—don't themselves have free will, well, you can see—or perhaps you can see where we're going with this—what about us?

If we are things in the—we're objects in the world—you, I'm part of your experience. You experience me through sensation, and the a priori modes of intuition, and the categories of understanding, Science can study me, and not through all those ways I am an object. If I am going to be studied by science, Kant says, then I must not have free will.

Because the category of necessary connection must apply to me, like it applies to everything else. So Kant was deeply aware of a problem that we mentioned in our very first lecture—namely, if science, the more successful science is—if it's successful because of causal determinism, that threatens a whole bunch of things we typically believe about ourselves. For example, like whether we have free will, whether we're more irresponsible etc.

Question #11a The main question he raises at this point is how we can save morality given the fact that the world of phenomena—the world of science, of which we are a part—is shot through with determinism.

From Cahoone's lecture: Now how does Kant’s new philosophy help him to deal with that problem?  

Remember he said there were two things that he loved, and were more important to him than anything else—the starry sky above us the moral life within us.

We're now on the second of those two phrases. How can he save the moral life within us from science?

Here's how: because science cannot know things-in-themselves, or anything not experienced, our beliefs about such things cannot be contradicted by science.

Put it very simply, science can never either prove or disprove the human possession of free will.

Now the reason is not hard to see. Let's step back—I'm an object in the world of experience. I'm a thing. You can roll me down an inclined plane or drop me out of an airplane and I'll fall, roughly according to Galileo's laws of motion, law of gravity. I'm another object to be studied. Presumably as science, speaking from the point of view of the th century. Presume any science gets smarter and smarter. It's going to find out all sorts of things about how my neurology—when you know chemistry—and more and more we're going to study the human being as a causal system. But that is studying Cahoon as an appearance.

Question #11b How does Kant save morality under these circumstances?

From Cahoone's lecture: But remember, every existent in Kant, exists in two senses—as an appearance and as a thing-in-itself—as a thing in itself just like the podium in itself.

Science can know nothing of that—it's unknowable, because it's beyond the bounds of a possible experience.

As an appearance, my will is unfree. It's studied by science. It's subject to necessary connection to all the different rules of the understanding and the intuition.

Hence, we can now believe my will is free. Regarding my self in itself, that is to say, Kant in himself, and Kant's will in itself, is untouched by science.

We can never know anything about it. We are free to believe it's free, and we have no fear of contradiction from advancing science. Because science can never get to the thing in itself.

Question #12 Are you convinced by his solution:  that we are both part of the world of phenomena, where we are not free, and the world of noumena—the world of things in themselves—where we are free to believe we are free?

From Cahoone's lecture: Now this applies not only to free will, but to belief in God, the soul, and a future state of reward or punishment. In other words, heaven or hell, all are unapproachable by science.

Hence, when we believe in them without fear, we can believe in them, without fear of contradiction from science.

The three ideas of reason, in fact, which reason posits as ultimate goals, or limits of inquiry, substance—the notion of substance—reason wants to find the ultimate substance of everything.

Reason wants to know about the ultimate mental substance, or soul, and about God—the ground of being all these things, of these matters.

Reason can't know nothing; reason knows nothing.

Question #13 How is the Understanding and Reason distinguished from each other in not knowing about fundamental things like whether there is a ground of being, freedom of will, a future state, etc.?

From Cahoone's lecture: In any case, inside Kant's theory of knowledge, the understanding, and the expand intuition of sensibility, can know nothing either, because we're beyond the bounds of possible experience.

 So, notice what's happened.

What Kant said is—all he's done here so far is—he's drawn a boundary and said—human investigation and science cannot cross this boundary, the f or outside of it.

We are free to believe what we like about the existence of God, the existence of the human free will, the soul, and a future state.

And nothing in science can ever—not just now but in its infinite advance in the future science, still can't—contradict anything.

Because science cannot make statements about things-in-themselves.

Now it's would be useful, in selection, just go a little further, to describe something about Kant's moral theory.

Because that's the real payoff to this background conception.

Question #14a How is Kant’s moral theory the real payoff to maintaining a distinction between the phenomenal realm and the noumenal realm?

From Cahoone's lecture: So, in fact, what Kant argues in his moral philosophy is—not only can we believe in God, the immortality of the soul, and a future state, in free will, all—for together those four ideas—not only can we, must as he argues, elsewhere in his Critique of Practical Reason and his Fundamental Principles of the Method metaphysics of morals—Kant argues that these are necessary presuppositions of practical moral reason—not of theoretical reason, that is, not of the conduct of reason that we've been concerned with today.  and last class In the first Critique—which just tries to say what we can know about the nature of things, in morality, a moral agent—for practical reasons—must believe in free will, a future state, and a God who rewards. Notice he's saying—this is very important—Kant is not claiming any of those things are true—he's saying we're free to believe them. We are practically or morally required to believe in them. Because he thinks—if we don't believe in them, we will not behave morally. In other words, they're necessary presuppositions for me to do the morally right thing.

Question #14b Why does he say that we can’t know as true that God exists, that our souls are immortal, that we have free will, but that we are free to believe these things AND even morally required to believe them?

From Cahoone's lecture: For Kant—for me to do the morally right thing—I must believe in my freedom, that I'm free to act and responsible to do so. I must believe that there is a God—Kant believes—who sets down moral laws of some kind. I must believe that there is a part of me not limited to this physical domain, which will be judged, in accordance with its performance or non-performance of those laws. That's morality, and this requires that we believe in free will, the soul, heaven, and God. But again only that we believe—not that we know—the existence of God cannot be known. The existence of the soul cannot be known. But one can believe in them.

Question #15 How do Kant’s conclusions relate to having faith?

Now, we can see what Kant meant when he said, “I had to limit knowledge in order to make room for faith.”

Question #16 What form of religion does he end up advocating?

From Cahoone's lecture: Now, religiously speaking, the resulting religion—if you want to call it that—was another form of deism—a philosophical conception of Christianity that could be found in a number of thinkers in the th century, including Rousseau. Essentially deism was a kind of intellectual’s version of Christianity—as understanding Christianity to mean a small set a minimal set of moral beliefs, without ritual or further dogma. So, in other words, for example, a deist might accept first that a monotheistic God created the world, that humans possess immortal souls, that there's an afterlife, and that God holds human beings to account for their moral achievements and transgressions. Many philosophers in the century turned to deism—Rousseau even made deism the state religion. We talked about this in the Rousseau lecture briefly—partly because it was the doctrinal overlap among existing religions in his book the Social Contract. At any rate these lessons were not lost on other German philosophers, on whom Kant had an enormous impact. Although they immediately set to changing his view. Kant, and fellow members of the German Enlightenment, were not satisfied with the skepticism of the British philosophers and their empiricism. Now, what Kant had sought to do was, as I said before, to give something to the rationalist and something to the empiricists. It's not that he merely struck a middle road—because on that middle road he discovered his Copernican revolution and a whole new way of doing philosophy. Nevertheless, he certainly did take something from the empiricists and something from the rationalists. But in terms of his novel claims—the first one is surely that Kant is the first modern philosopher. One might argue that there's bits and pieces of this in the Aristotelian tradition. But for all intents and purposes—the first modern philosopher to say that—in a very real sense—your mind is creating your experience. It isn't creating every little piece of it; it's not creating it out of nothing. There's something coming in from the outside, but your mind is forming—it like a painter who is being thrown paint and who is catching it and forming—it into reliable objects. And all of our minds are doing that at the same time with the same bits of experience. This is not subjectivism; it's the unit which does the organizing. It is the transcendental activity of any human mind—of the rational—of the mind of any rational being.

Question #17 What, in view of the foregoing, is his concept of practical reason?

From Cahoone's lecture: Secondly, for Kant, the practical will can rightly extend beyond experience, and believe what cannot be known. Because it directly determines its object. The will—this is a slightly technical point—but it means simply this—is recognizing that in some ways, the theoretical employment of our mind—that is our attempt to know things—that's what he means by the theoretical employment—our attempt to know things—reason tries to know things. It's one of the things reason does. Another thing reason does, is try to tell us what to do, and get us to do the right thing in its moral or practical employment—Kant used those words interchangeably—moral practical—in our moral practical employment. Reason—you might say—has a bigger reach than it does in its theoretical employment. Because in its moral employment its job, in the end, is merely to tell the will what to do. And that it can do it creates laws or rules, which the will can obey. Reason—once again as we saw there know—in Kant is the ultimate power of the mind, beyond mere empirical understanding or science. Reason posits both the practical ethics and the unity of all experience. What is the bottom line here—Kant changed everything. Everyone since has had to answer Kant—and not just in philosophy, in psychology, even in biology, in many fields. Kant’s enduring legacy included many problems. He certainly initiated—what we then called—German idealism, which we'll talk about next, and which took his views rather much further than Kant would have wanted to take them. But wherever you see someone saying, that the human mind in its task of knowing things is actively structuring what it knows, that the experience you and I have at this moment is predigested by our mind, it isn't just passively imposed on the mind but rather the mind is actively organizing what is there—whenever you hear anyone say anything like that—you are listening to Kant

Question #18 Can you think of any passages that correlate with his conceptions of 1) faith; 2) the idea of things-in-themselves; 3) his approach to morality.

answer

Question #19a What are some of the major insights from the first nine lectures that you feel are particularly relevant to understanding our modern condition and the role of religion in the further advancement of this condition? 

From Cahoone's lecture: The beginning of modern thought via Descartes who tried to reconcile Newtonian science with religious beliefs, ethics, human life and its value by rupturing with scholasticism. Descartes made room for greater progress in understanding the role of the wing of science in the advancement of human civilization. But Descartes believed that if he could find the right place to stand and a lever long enough there was nothing that science could not answer. Kant dismantled foundationalism by positing the limits to human knowledge and in so doing he made room for faith.

Kant’s concept of the human mind as an active structuring system flipped Descartes’

Kant’s practical reason and passages from the Writings

“Know, verily, that the soul is a sign of God, a heavenly gem whose reality the most learned of men hath failed to grasp, and whose mystery no mind, however acute, can ever hope to unravel. It is the first among all created things to declare the excellence of its Creator, the first to recognize His glory, to cleave to His truth, and to bow down in adoration before Him." Bahá’u’lláh Chapter 82. Gleanings.

According to ‘Abdu’l-Bahá, the soul has two faculties, the physical and the spiritual, explaining that "

As outer circumstances are communicated to the soul by the eyes, ears brain of a man, so does the soul communicate its desires and purposes through the brain to the hands and tongue of the physical body, thereby expressing itself. The spirit of the soul is the very essence of life. With regards to mental faculties, He explains that “they are in truth of the inherent properties of the soul, even as the radiation of light is the essential property of the sun.”  ‘Abdu’l-Bahá. Discourse at “l’Alliance Spiritualiste” Paris Talks

And even if the intellect weakens and changes, the soul remains unchanged. Although the body’s atoms disintegrate and disperse at death, the soul, which is an indivisible essence, is eternal and can never be destroyed.

‘Abdu’l-Bahá also asserts that although the human being carries within it the mineral, vegetable and animal kingdoms,

“… the superiority of man over the rest of the created world is seen again in this, that man has a soul in which dwells the divine spirit...” ‘Abdu’l-Bahá,

From Cahoone's lecture: "This people, all of them, have pictured a god in the realm of the mind, and worship that image which they have made for themselves. And yet that image is comprehended, the human mind being the comprehender thereof, and certainly the comprehender is greater than that which lieth within its grasp; for imagination is but the branch, while mind is the root; and certainly the root is greater than the branch. Consider then, how all the peoples of the world are bowing the knee to a fancy of their own contriving, how they have created a creator within their own minds, and they call it the Fashioner of all that is—whereas in truth it is but an illusion. Thus are the people worshipping only an error of perception." #24 (Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l‑Bahá) The human mind is greater than the images and ideas it imagines. The human mind exists, we can know that of a certainty but we cannot know of a certainty that what we imagine God to be is true. The human mind is the root and the imagination only a branch. See Descartes on the "essence of mind is thought”. The the mind/soul of man is a mental substance. "Mind does not take up space; your thought does not take up space. A thought has no space; an idea has no volume, no width or breadth." (Cahoone 2010:36)

mode is a property of a substance - for example - the mind? The mode of the mind, a mental substance, could be imagination, for example Imagining a unicorn is a way of being thought).

‘Abdu’l-Bahá – 5 – "God Comprehends All; He Cannot Be Comprehended" Friday evening, October 20th Paris Talks

‘Abdu’l-Bahá 28 – Discourse at “l’Alliance Spiritualiste” Salle de l’Athénée, St. Germain, Paris, November 9th Paris Talks

Bahá’u’lláh. Chapter 82. LXXXII: "Thou hast asked Me concerning the nature of the soul." Gleanings

contention that to know about nature it is essential to know about God and specifically that God will not lead us astray if we are conscientious in our search for truth?

"Be thou not surprised at this. Reflect upon the inner realities of the universe, the secret wisdoms involved, the enigmas, the interrelationships, the rules that govern all. For every part of the universe is connected with every other part by ties that are very powerful and admit of no imbalance, nor any slackening whatever. In the physical realm of creation, all things are eaters and eaten: the plant drinketh in the mineral, the animal doth crop and swallow down the plant, man doth feed upon the animal, and the mineral devoureth the body of man. Physical bodies are transferred past one barrier after another, from one life to another, and all things are subject to transformation and change, save only the essence of existence itself—since it is constant and immutable, and upon it is founded the life of every species and kind, of every contingent reality throughout the whole of creation." Chapter 137. Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l Bahá.

‘Abdu’l‑Bahá. Chapter 137. "Be thou not surprised at this." Selections from the Writings of ‘Abdu’l‑Bahá.

Question #19b Which passages from the writings of the Faith are especially relevant?

Relationship between science and religion; limits to our knowledge as in things-in-themselves; 

SEP He is now in a position to argue that we can have a priori knowledge about the basic laws of modern science because those laws reflect the human mind’s contribution to structuring our experience. In other words, the sensible world necessarily conforms to certain fundamental laws – such as that every event has a cause – because the human mind constructs it according to those laws. 

Baha’I writings

Abdul baha on those who claim that only the senses matter.